| 词汇 | Malicious Prosecution, Malicious Prosecution, Or Malicious Arrest2 |
| 释义 | `1`Malicious Prosecution, Malicious Prosecution, Or Malicious Arrest2 `2` "Legal Lexicon": 13 Cal.3d 43, Franzen v. Shenk (1923) 192 Cal. 572, and Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375. As the Supreme Court put it in Sheldon Appel, in each of those cases the "plaintiff's contention was that the prior action had been prosecuted 'with knowledge of the falsity of the claim . . . .'" (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p.880, incl fn. 8) Moreover, the "fundamental interest" protected by the malicious prosecution tort is "'freedom from unjustifiable and unreasonable litigation." Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 882. For this reason, even under the subjective belief standard rejected in Sheldon Appel (the question used to be whether the attorney had an "honest belief" that his client's claim was tenable, e.g. Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 675, 683), a jury verdict in the client's favor in the underlying case was "conclusive evidence of the existence of probable cause even though subsequently reversed." (Cowles v. Carter (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 356.) That rule was based on the notion that persons who initiate civil proceedings should not thereafter be subjected to malicious prosecution litigation unless it could be shown that they acted without probable cause -- and that if probable cause had been determined by the trier of fact in the prior proceedings, it was not subject to reevaluation even when the jury's determination was reversed. (Ibid; see also Gause v. McClelland (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 762, 764; Black v. Knight (1919) 44 Cal.App. 756, 770; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 785-788.) The several references in Sheldon Appel to freedom from "unjustifiable" and "unreasonable" litigation suggests the continuing validity of the rule that a prior determination of "probable cause" cannot be second- guessed in a malicious prosecution action even where the judgment in the underlying action is reversed on appeal. It follows necessarily that where the record in the underlying action is equally complete (albeit with a different ending), it constitutes all the evidence needed to determine whether the underlying action was objectively tenable when it was filed. Accordingly, there are no disputed facts concerning the record in the underlying action, the trial court may by summary judgment determine the probable cause issue, and the attorney's knowledge is entirely irrelevant. After holding that an attorney's "reasonable" research and "industrious" investigation are legally irrelevant to the determination of probable cause, (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp.882-883), and that expert testimony is not admissible on the question of probable cause (id. at p. 884), the Supreme Court concluded with the articulation of a standard for determining whether the underlying action was objectively tenable when filed. In Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 868, the California Supreme Court held that where "there is no dispute as to the facts upon which an attorney acted in filing the prior action, the question whether there was probable cause to institute the prior action is purely a legal question, to be determined by the trial court on the basis of whether, as an objective matter, the prior action was legally tenable or not. If the court determines that the prior action was not objectively tenable - - and thus concludes that the action was brought without probable cause -- evidence of the extent of an attorney's legal research may be relevant to the further question of whether the prior action was instituted with malice, but if the court finds that the prior action was in fact tenable, probable cause is established -- and the malicious prosecution action fails -- without regard to the adequacy or inadequacy of the attorney's legal research efforts." Consideration of the actual holding of Sheldon Appel and of the reasons Go to Malicious Prosecution, Malicious Prosecution, Or Malicious Arrest3 |
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